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The People’s Republic of China (“PRC” or “China”) is in the process of 
amending the 2006 PRC Securities Law.  At the time of writing of this paper -- or early 
October 2015 -- a first draft of the new PRC Securities Law has not yet been released 
publicly by China’s National People’s Congress (“NPC”), probably because of the 
market turbulence experienced on Chinese exchanges commencing in July 2015 and the 
extraordinary remedies undertaken by the Chinese government in response.1  
Nonetheless, the amendment process continues, and so in connection with that process 
this paper sets forth a detailed critique of the statute and administrative law-based insider 
trading prohibition and enforcement regime currently in effect in the PRC, and then a 
concrete suggestion for the ways in which the new Securities Law (and related 
administrative regulation) can – and I argue, must -- be changed to create a more coherent 
and effective system for enforcement against this particularly harmful kind of market 
manipulation.  
                                                 
1  See a decidedly negative U.S. Congress appraisal of the PRC government 
response in the aftermath of the Shanghai Exchange collapse at Nargiza Salidjanova, 
China’s Stock Market Collapse and Government’s Response, U.S.–CHINA ECONOMIC 
AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION ISSUE BRIEF, July 13, 2015, available at 
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%E2%80%99s%20Stock%
20Market%20Collapse%20and%20Government%E2%80%99s%20Response.pdf (last 
visited October 2, 2015). 
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The domestic capital markets of the PRC have come a very long way in over two 
decades.  With an initial market capitalization of just US$ 2 billion in 1991,2 by the end 
of 2014 the aggregate market capitalization of the almost 3,000 issuers listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (for mid-June 2015, 1,062 on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and 1,709 on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange) exceeded US$ 3.7 trillion, a 
figure that excludes the market capitalization of PRC-domiciled or offshore-domiciled 
but PRC–controlled issuers listing on foreign exchanges.3 
 
Notwithstanding this impressive expansion of domestic Exchanges and Chinese 
issuer participation in the global capital markets, the building and staffing of a securities 
regulatory system from scratch, and the rise of a relatively autonomous Chinese financial 
press, the Chinese markets continue to experience volatility and some significant level of 
dysfunction.  One of the widely acknowledged problems is securities fraud, specifically 
insider trading, which has been pervasive in the Chinese markets since the establishment 
of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges in 1990-91.4  Insider trading takes many forms 
in the PRC.  Certainly the classic situation – where insiders use non-public material 
information from and regarding their own company to trade in the stock of that company 
prior to an announcement affecting the market price of that company’s securities – occurs 
very frequently.  The case against insiders at Zhejiang Hangxiao Steel Structure Co., Ltd. 
is an example.  In the period after a March 2007 announcement of a large infrastructure 
contract won by the firm in Angola, the company’s stock rose 150%.  Insiders who 
purchased before the announcement and sold afterwards were to said to have profited by 
over US$ 5 million.  The big Angola contract proved to be fictitious, causing a huge price 
slump, but only after the insiders had dumped their pre-announcement purchases at the 
                                                 
2 Or 10.8 billion renminbi yuan (“RMB”) at the official 1991 RMB:US$ 
exchange rate of 5.32:1.  See Feng Wei, The Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges: 
Business Operation, Governance Structure and Regulatory Function (Asian Development 
Bank, 2000), at 332 (Table 20-1), available at: 
http://www.adb.org/documents/books/demutualization_stock_exchanges/chapter_20.pdf 
(last visited October 2, 2015). 
3 See The World Bank IBRD-IDA, Market Capitalization of Listed 
Companies, available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD (last 
visited October 2, 2015). 
4 See Ling Huawei, Qiao Xiaohui, Fu Tao & Hu Runfeng, Neimu Jiaoyi 
“Wenyi” [The Insider Trading “Plague”], 186 CAIJING, May 28, 2007, at 66-69 
(hereinafter, “Insider Trading Plague”); and Shen Han, A Comparative Study of Insider 
Trading Regulation Enforcement in the U.S. and China, 9 J. Bus. & Sec. L. 41, 56-60 
(2007). 
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high end.5  At the same time, a good deal of the activity commonly understood or 
reported in the Chinese and foreign media as “insider trading” in China is more closely 
akin to securities trading manipulation by what the Chinese idiom broadly labels 
“[casino] dealers” (zhuangjia).  For instance, “front running” by “rat-cellars” 
(laoshucang) – where mutual fund managers purchase the stock of an issuer before the 
fund they direct makes purchases of the same stock (triggering a price rise in the stock) – 
is also said infect the high volume domestic securities fund industry.  A variant of this is 
a common breaching of the state-private gap in China, where non-insider private fund 
managers are tipped by non-insider state-owned mutual funds that they about to purchase 
a given issuer’s stock, with an inevitable price rise upon the large state mutual funds 
purchase becoming known (and the state tipper and private tippee splitting the 
extraordinary profits).6  Accordingly, administrative enforcement actions and even 
criminal prosecutions for this kind of activity are effected pursuant to statutory 
prohibitions on “securities trading manipulation”, and not “insider trading”.  
 
At the same time, enforcement against insider trading has been anemic. One 
author reviewing the period between 2002 and the end of 2006, or the period prior to the 
issuance of what this paper calls the “2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions”, notes 
the application of administrative sanctions by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (“CSRC”) in 196 cases of securities fraud, only one of which (in 2004) 
relates to insider trading.7  A review of the year in securities regulation for 2009 by 
Shanghai Stock Exchange officials8 listed only six completed enforcement actions, but 
also noted wide press coverage of four other insider trading scandals involving 
government officials straddling political and economic power.  Likewise, a close review 
                                                 
5 See Insider Trading Plague, supra note 3, at 67.  For similar breaches see 
also the Lin Shiquan and Liu Yang China Securities Regulatory Commission 
enforcement decisions infra.   
6 See Gady Epstein, “Market Maker,” Forbes, Jan. 28, 2008, available at: 
http://www.forbes.com/global/2008/0128/050.html (last visited October 2, 2015).   
7 See Han, supra note 3, at 57.  See also Benjamin L. Liebman and Curtis J. 
Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China’s Securities Market, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 929, 
942 (2010) (for 2001-2006: “the number of [CSRC] sanctions seems rather modest given 
the ubiquity and severity of the problems with…insider trading… in China’s stock 
markets.”) 
8 See Wu Weiying & Pu Lifen, 2009 Nian Zhongguo Zhengquan Fazhi 
Pingshu [2009 China Securities Rule of Law Commentary], 2 Zhengquan Fayuan 
[Securities Landscape] 361, 373-4 (2010). 
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of publicly announced enforcement decisions9 by the CSRC shows few that are related to 
insider trading, and invariably only with respect to very minor actors.   
 
The reasons for this weak enforcement record are well-known in China, and 
include: regulatory resource constraints; low levels of investigatory sophistication and 
deficient technical means; difficulties in contemporaneous detection and obtaining 
evidence;10 the regulator’s inability to act as a civil action plaintiff (and thus extract 
information and/or settlements from market participants); constraints on the private civil 
action applicable across China’s corporate law and securities law regimes; the uneven 
competence, autonomy and independence of China’s judiciary; and – of overwhelming 
importance in the Chinese context—the political and economic power of some of the 
most flagrant violators, whether individuals or institutions.  Some Chinese analysts even 
point to a conflict in the role of China’s securities regulator, the CSRC: tasked on one 
side with the protection of investors and market transparency, and on the other side “… 
provid[ing] the [state-owned enterprises] with preferential access to the financial 
resources of the capital market for the best interests of the government; …”.11  Less 
acknowledged as a reason for weak or non-existent enforcement of the insider trading 
prohibition in the PRC is the subject of this paper – the unworkable architecture of the 
statutory prohibition against insider trading embedded in the 2006 PRC Securities Law, 
which has presented serious obstacles to both civil (the CSRC) and criminal (the People’s 
Procuratorate) enforcement authorities by needlessly narrowing the scope of insider 
trading liability, and caused the CSRC, at least in the civil sphere, to act illegally and 
ultra vires with respect to many of the insider trading prohibitions it does pursue.  
 
Whatever the cluster of reasons for it, lackluster enforcement against insider 
trading in China can fuel a vicious circle: obstacles to robust enforcement can ensure that 
the costs of insider trading are minimal or non-existent, especially when compared to the 
benefits on offer, which in turn only encourages further insider trading in the Chinese 
markets.  Accordingly, this paper suggests a wholesale renovation of the PRC Securities 
                                                 
9 Posted continually at:  
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/index.htm?channel=3300/3313 (last visited 
October 2, 2015). 
10 “With respect to the investigation of insider trading, [we] face two issues: 
difficulties in obtaining evidence and recognition…” May 2007 statement by a CSRC 
No. 1 Enforcement Department official), Insider Trading Plague, supra note 3, at 66. 
11 Han, supra note 3, at 58 (pointing to the “quota” system discontinued 
more than a decade ago, and the continued presence of poorly-performing state-owned 
enterprises listed on China’s domestic capital markets).   This author does not concur 
with Han Shen’s notion of a conflicted CSRC, a view informed by almost 20 years of 
interaction with the CSRC and its officers. 
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Law’s statutory architecture for the prohibition against insider trading so as to at least 
provide the basis for better enforcement against such market manipulation where it can 
be identified.   
 
In this paper, I proceed as follows.  In Section II, I describe the statutory and 
administrative law norms currently governing insider trading in China.  In Section III, I 
provide a detailed critique of the current regime, being careful to distinguish the formal, 
statutory, scheme on one hand, and the wholly conflicting agency scheme imposed by the 
CSRC on the other.  In Section IV, I detail how the insider trading prohibition is being 
enforced pursuant to the dysfunctional scheme detailed in Section III.  Sections III and IV 
are designed to justify my case for wholesale amendment of the insider trading 
prohibition in any amended PRC Securities Law.  Finally, in Section V, I urge a solution 
to the present dysfunction, and a way forward so that China can achieve a coherent and 
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II. Legal and Regulatory Norms for Insider Trading in the PRC 
 
The legal and regulatory norms governing insider trading have developed quickly 
in the PRC, and concurrent with (or sometimes even before) the formal, legal, 
establishment of the PRC’s domestic capital markets and stock exchanges.  With the 
establishment of China’s first post-1949 exchanges, the governments of Shanghai (on 
November 27, 1990) and Shenzhen (on May 15, 1991) promulgated municipal-level 
“measures” that explicitly prohibited “insider trading” (neimu jiaoyi).12  In April 1993, 
the State Council Securities Commission (“SCSC”)—the State Council department 
originally above the newly-established CSRC—promulgated the first national regulation 
concerning securities issuance and trading, the Provisional Regulations on the 
Administration of Stock Issuance and Trading (“SCSC Issuance and Trading 
Regulations”) which also explicitly prohibited “insider trading”.  That prohibition was 
echoed in the September 1993 Provisional Measures on Prohibiting Securities Fraud 
Behavior issued by the SCSC (“SCSC Securities Fraud Measures”).  In October 1997, the 
NPC amended the Criminal Law to include the crime of “insider trading”, but without 
any elaboration on the elements of this new crime (other than heightened mens rea-type 
requirements which work across the Criminal Law).   
 
Only in 1999, with passage of the PRC’s first Securities Law was insider trading 
extensively described and prohibited in a non-criminal “law”, a formulation largely 
carried over into the revised Securities Law effective on January 1, 2006 (“2006 PRC 
Securities Law”).  The 2006 PRC Securities Law also contains related prohibitions on 
“short swing trading” and “manipulative securities trading.”13  The short swing profits 
rule is modeled on the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 16(b), and forces 
directors, supervisory board members, senior management, and substantial shareholders 
(5% or above) to disgorge to the corporation profits arising from trading within a six 
month window.  There are no scienter requirements or affirmative defenses under 
Chinese law for breach of the short swing trading prohibition.  Company directors also 
have direct personal liability for any short swing trading.  Interestingly, if the company 
                                                 
12 See Article 39 of the November 27, 1990 Shanghaishi Zhengquan Jiaoyi 
Guanli Banfa [Shanghai Municipal Measures on the Administration of Securities 
Trading], and Article 43 of the May 15, 1991 Shenzhenshi Gupiao Faxing Yü Jiaoyi 
Guanli Zanxing Banfa [Shenzhen Municipal Interim Measures on the Administration of 
Stock Issuance and Trading].  The Chinese “neimu jiaoyi” for “insider trading” is a 
neologism that first entered China’s regulatory lexicon in the October 1990 Provisional 
Measures on the Administration of Securities Companies (Zhengquan Gongsi Guanli 
Zanxing Banfa). 
13 2006 PRC Securities Law, arts. 47 (short swing trading) and 77 
(manipulative securities trading).   
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board does not seek such disgorgement, even after shareholder demand, the shareholders 
have a legal right to implement a kind of ad hoc derivative action, and sue for 
disgorgement “in the name of the company.”  (This is not to be confused with the PRC’s 
corporate derivative action, also established in the 2006 PRC Company Law.)   
 
On March 3, 2007, the CSRC conceived an internal “guidance document” 
(zhidaoxing wenjian) on the 2006 PRC Securities Law statutory prohibition on insider 
trading, the (Provisional) Guide for the Recognition and Confirmation of Insider Trading 
Behavior in the Securities Markets (“Insider Trading Guidance Provisions”).14  The 
Insider Trading Guidance Provisions by their own terms are not “public” understood as a 
term of art under Chinese legislative and rule-making practice,15 they are not posted on 
the CSRC website, and are not included in any form of legislative or regulatory gazette, 
and therefore are not norms of which market participants have any formal notice.  
Moreover, they are not a species of any of the legally enforceable legal-regulatory norms 
permitted in the Chinese system.  Instead, they are only non-legal and non-regulatory 
guidance directed to CSRC staff, subordinate (local-level) securities regulatory bodies, 
and the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges regarding the application of law and 
the implementation of administrative enforcement. 
 
Finally, on May 22, 2012 the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate of the PRC jointly released an “Explanation” governing the enforcement of 
China’s statutory insider trading prohibition, but only with respect to criminal 
prosecutions (“Criminal Enforcement Explanation”).16  
                                                 
14 Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guanyu Yinfa 
“Zhengquan Shichang Caozong Xingwei Rending Zhiyin (Shixing)” Ji “Zhengquan 
Shichang Neimu Jiaoyi Xingwei Rending Zhiyin (Shixing)” De Tongzhi [Notice of the 
CSRC Regarding the Printing and Distribution of the “(Provisional) Guide for the 
Recognition and Confirmation of Manipulative Behavior in the Securities Markets” and 
the “(Provisional) Guide for the Recognition and Confirmation of Insider Trading 
Behavior in the Securities Markets”] (not promulgated but distributed internally by the 
CSRC, Mar. 27, 2007), available at 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/NewLaw2002/SLC/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=144622  (a CSRC 
notice which distributes guidance provisions for both insider trading and manipulative 
securities trading (the latter actionable under Article 77 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law)) 
(last visited October 2, 2015). 
15 They are, however, widely available, for instance on the subscriber on-line 
collection of Chinese laws and regulations ChinaLawInfo, available at: 
http://www.chinalawinfo.com.  
16  Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan Guanyu Banli 








III. Insider Trading Regime(s) 
 
China’s present insider trading regulatory regime is plagued by contradictions 
which arise in two contexts: (i) within the formal provisions of the Securities Law itself, 
and (ii) as between the system articulated in the statute, on one hand, and as articulated 
and enforced via agency action of dubious legality, on the other.  The latter conflict, 
between the 2006 PRC Securities Law regime and administrative enforcement under the 
2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions which cuts the insider trading breach out of a 
whole new cloth, is the more pronounced – a problem implicitly recognized with the 
release of the Criminal Enforcement Explanation in May 2012, which attempts to draw at 
least criminal enforcement practice back into the bounds of the statutory scheme.  As I 
will describe below, this second, non-law based, structure authorizes enforcement of 
insider trading liability against mere possessors of non-public, material, information who 
happen to trade securities during an ex post determined price sensitive period.  The 2006 
PRC Securities Law, conversely, describes something closer to (what U.S. jurisprudence 
calls) a “classical” or fiduciary duty-based theory of insider trading liability alongside a 
separate “misappropriation” type basis.  I have argued that the 2007 Insider Trading 
Guidance Provisions are void and unenforceable, and subject to legal challenge on their 
face or as applied.17  Notwithstanding, because the CSRC enforces insider trading law in 
China pursuant to both sets of norms, in this paper I examine the entirety of the PRC 
insider trading prohibition derived from both the 2006 Securities Law and the 2007 
Insider Trading Guidance Provisions so as to critique the regime, but also identify the 
way forward for possible amendment of the PRC Securities Law. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jieshi [Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate Explanation Regarding 
Certain Specific Law Application Issues in the Handling of Criminal Cases of Insider 
Trading and the Communication of Inside Information] (passed by the Sup. People’s Ct. 
Adjudication Comm. Oct. 31, 2011 and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate Feb. 27, 
2012, issued May 22, 2012), available at 
http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sjfs/201205/t20120522_177170 (last visited October 2, 
2015). 
17 See Nicholas Calcina Howson, Enforcement Without Foundation? - 
Insider Trading and China's Administrative Law Crisis, 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 955 (2012) 
(hereinafter Enforcement Without Foundation). 
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a. The Statutory Scheme 
 
The 2006 PRC Securities Law addresses insider trading at eight places.18  In U.S. 
jurisprudential terms, the regime introduced in the 2006 statute rejects the so-called 
“equal access” theory while adhering to the Cady, Roberts/Chiarella line (but with 
defendants identified in the Securities Law or an authorized regulatory enactment), and 
adding an O’Hagan-like misappropriation basis.   
 
Article 73 of the Securities Law prohibits (i) “persons with knowledge of inside 
information” and (ii) those “who have illegally procured inside information,” from 
“using” inside information to engage in securities trading activities.  On a first view, the 
2006 PRC Securities Law rejects the confines of a U.S.-style “classical” theory by 
broadening the scope of defendants from status insiders to those who simply have 
knowledge of inside information.  For scholars familiar with U.S. jurisprudence, this 
regime initially looks like the SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur19 equal access theory expansion 
of Cady, Roberts & Co.,20which extended insider trading liability from corporate insiders 
to anyone in possession of material, non-public, information. (Texas Gulf Sulphur was 
subsequently cut back to the “classical” or fiduciary duty-based theory in Chiarella v. 
United States,21 so that liability was narrowed to those in breach of a fiduciary or special 
relationship of trust and confidence with the trading counterparty).22  If this initial 
reading would hold, the 2006 PRC Securities Law would have represented a significant 
departure from the earliest iterations of insider trading law in China, which addressed 
only the actions of formal status insiders in the style of Cady, Roberts.23 
 
                                                 
18 See 2006 PRC Securities Law, arts. 5 (basic prohibition against insider 
trading), 47 (short-swing trading by insiders), 73-76 (elaborated provisions on insider 
trading, analyzed here), 180 (power of CSRC to stop trading in suspect securities), and 
202 (administrative penalties and measures).  Criminal prosecution for the established 
crime of insider trading (at Article 180 of the PRC Criminal Law) is explicitly authorized 
at Article 231, while civil damages (and, perhaps, a private claim in damages) are given a 
legal basis in the final clause of Article 76. 
19 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 
U.S. 976 (1969). 
20 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
21 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
22 Outside of the tender offer context, where the equal access theory lives on 
in the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission’s Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 
14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3. 
23 See Article 81 of the SCSC Issuance and Trading Regulations, and Article 
5 of the SCSC Securities Fraud Measures. 
9
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On closer inspection, however, the 2006 statute does no such thing, for Article 74 
of the 2006 PRC Securities Law narrows the scope of possible defendants to “include” 
(baokuo) a roster of traditional company, market and regulatory insiders, and other 
persons stipulated in regulation by the CSRC.  Those statutory persons with knowledge 
of insider information are: directors, supervisory board members, and senior managers of 
the issuer; 5% or more shareholders of the company and its/their directors, supervisory 
board members and senior managers, and the actual controlling shareholders of the 
company  and its/their directors, supervisory board members and senior managers; 
directors, supervisory board members and senior managers of companies controlled by 
the issuer [appropriately adjusted in the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, 
Article 6(2)(ii), to mean: “the controlling shareholders of the issuer or listed company, 
other companies controlled by the actual control party, and their directors, supervisory 
board members and senior management”]; people whose executive or staff position in the 
company provides access to inside information; CSRC staff and others who administer or 
regulate securities issuance and trading; and securities sponsors, underwriters, securities 
exchange personnel, securities registration personnel, and securities service institution 
personnel (which presumably includes lawyers and accountants). 
 
A critical question is whether the Chinese characters “baokuo” for “include” or 
“including” in Article 74 means “including only” or “including without limitation.”  
Increasingly, Chinese statutes follow contemporary Chinese language contractual 
drafting conventions, so that if the drafter seeks to codify the “including without 
limitation” idea, the character phrase “baokuo danbuxianyu” is used.  That phrase is not 
employed in the 2006 statute.  Accordingly, the effect of Article 74 is to limit the scope 
of insider trading defendants qua “persons with knowledge of inside information” to 
those persons or institutions listed in the article itself.  In U.S. jurisprudential terms, the 
2006 regime rejects the equal access theory while adhering to the Cady, 
Roberts/Chiarella line, with parties potentially liable identified in or via the Securities 
Law.   
 
In direct tension with the 2006 PRC Securities Law declaration of fealty to 
classical insider trading doctrine at Article 74 are (i) the second prong of Article 73 (read 
in conjunction with a phrase in Article 76) and (ii) the significant delegation of regulatory 
authority to the CSRC in Article 74(vii):   
 
The second prong of Article 73 along with one clause of Article 76 provides a 
separate “misappropriation” basis for insider trading.  Those liable for insider trading 
sourced in misappropriation – described as the “those who have illegally procured inside 
information” (feifa huoqu neimu xinxi de ren)—are identified separately from, and do not 
have to be in the class of, “persons with knowledge of inside information” enumerated in 
10




Article 74.  In U.S. jurisprudential terms, this tracks the 1997 United States v. O’Hagan24 
innovation, creating an expanded basis of insider trading liability for traders who breach a 
fiduciary duty or other special relationship with the source of the inside information (per 
Chiarella the special duty or relationship must be with the trading counterparty).  In such 
cases, the government only needs to demonstrate: (i) “illegal procurement” of 
information, (ii) that such information is “inside information”, (iii) use of that inside 
information to trade, and (iv) trading of securities (of an issuer related in some way to the 
information).  There is no requirement that the people who engage in misappropriation 
and trading be members of the Article 74 enumerated class of “persons with knowledge 
of inside information.”   
 
The last clause of 2006 PRC Securities Law Article 74 authorizes the CSRC to 
identify by regulation “others” aside from the traditional insiders enumerated in Article 
74(i)–(vi) as “persons with knowledge of inside information.”  (There was no need to 
instruct the CSRC to augment the scope of defendants guilty of misappropriation because 
there is no defined class of “persons who have illegally procured inside information.”)  
Given the strong focus on statutorily-enumerated insiders described above, the grant of 
regulatory authority to the CSRC in Article 74(vii) to widen the scope of “persons with 
knowledge of inside information” originally represented a very significant nod in the 
direction of loosening the under-inclusive list of insider trading defendants.  It was also 
consistent with larger patterns in PRC legislative practice designed to allow a certain 
level of generality in law, while conferring significant discretion on administrative 
institutions. 
 
In defining what the prohibited “use” of inside information is, the 2006 PRC 
Securities Law at Article 76 elaborates on the legal duties of (i) those “with knowledge of 
inside information”, and (ii) those who have misappropriated inside information, duties 
which again seem to track, in part, the U.S.-style, disclose or abstain from trading rule:  
people in possession of inside information [relevant to specific] securities trading are 
prohibited from (i) purchasing or selling that company’s securities, (ii) disclosing such 
information, or (iii) suggesting that others purchase or sell such securities, in each case at 
any time before such inside information is publicly disclosed.  Article 76 of the 2006 
PRC Securities Law – and specifically the clause prohibiting “suggesting that others 
purchase or sell such securities”—therefore forms an additional basis in Chinese law for 
insider trading liability, or what other jurisdictions call “tipper” liability.  This liability 
exists even where the defendant has not actually engaged in securities trading, though 
assuredly “used” inside information.  Conversely, “tippees” are not subject to insider 
trading liability, at least insofar as they are not “persons with knowledge of inside 
                                                 
24 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
11
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information” per Article 74, or have not engaged in misappropriation of inside 
information under Articles 73 and 76.  
 
The 2006 PRC Securities Law sets out a statutory definition of “inside 
information”, while granting the CSRC authority to “recognize and confirm” (rending) 
other information that is inside information.  In U.S. terms, the focus of these 
determinations is on the materiality (or “importance”) of the information, and the degree 
to which it is public.  The earliest definition of inside information under Chinese law 
came in 1993 at Article 5 of the SCSC Securities Fraud Measures, which stipulated that 
“inside information” consists of important (zhongda) non-public information known by 
traditional (status) insiders that might influence the price of securities traded in the 
market, but then also listed twenty-five other kinds of “important” information.  Article 
75 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law (largely tracking Article 69 of the 1999 PRC 
Securities Law) defines “inside information” broadly as:  “… non-public information 
relevant to a company’s business or financial affairs or which may have a major 
(zhongda) effect on the market price of that company’s securities…”  The Chinese 
character set “zhongda” translated here as “important” or “major” can be understood as 
the equivalent of “material.”  There is a much theoretical writing in the PRC on how to 
evaluate “importance” (zhongdaxing) or materiality, including a focus on standards 
objective (did the information in fact have a significant effect on price?) and subjective 
(would or did the information impact the decisions of a normal or reasonable investor?).25   
There is no indication that these considerations are employed in actual enforcement.  
 
Article 75 then lists items that are deemed to be inside information, including a 
cross-reference to the Securities Law Article 67(2) list of major events subject to U.S. 
SEC Form 8-K-like continuing disclosure.  These items include: (i) the major (zhongda) 
events listed in Article 67(2) of the 2006 PRC Securities Law; (ii) company plans for 
distribution of dividends or increase of registered capital; (iii) major changes in the 
company’s capital structure; (iv) major changes in the company’s debt 
security/guaranties; (v) any single mortgage, sale or write-off of a major business asset of 
the company which exceeds 30% of the [value of] the asset; (vi) potential liability for 
major damages to be assumed under law as a result of behavior by a company’s directors, 
supervisory board members, or senior management personnel; (vii) plans related to the 
acquisition of a listed company; and (viii) other important (zhongyao) information 
recognized and confirmed by the CSRC to have a significant effect (xuanzhu yinxiang) 
on the trading price of securities.  The cross-reference to Article 67(2) of the 2006 PRC 
Securities Law imports the following items into the statutory definition of “inside 
                                                 
25 See for example: Ye Lin, Neimuxinxi De Falü Guanzhi [The Insider 
Trading Legal Regime], in ZHENGQUANFA JIAOCHENG [SECURITIES LAW] 314-5 
(Ye Lin, Duan Wei, Wang Shihua & Wang Huajie, eds., 2010).     
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information”: (i) a major change in a company’s business program or scope of business; 
(ii) a decision by the company regarding a major investment or asset disposition; (iii) 
conclusion by the company of an important (zhongyao) contract which may produce a 
significant (zhongyao) effect on the company’s assets, liabilities, rights and interests or 
business results; (iv) the company’s incurrence of a major debt or default on a significant 
(zhongda) debt that is past due; (v) a major deficit or losses incurred by the company ; 
(vi) a major change in the external conditions affecting production or business of the 
company; (vii) a change in the chairman of the board, or not less than one third of the 
directors or the manager of the company; (viii) a relatively significant (jiaoda) change in 
the holdings or control of shareholders who hold 5% or more of the company’s shares or 
the company’s controlling shareholders; (ix) a decision by the company to reduce its 
registered capital, to merge, split, or dissolve, or to file bankruptcy; (x) [information 
relating to] major litigation involving the company, or voiding or declaration of non-
effectiveness under law of a shareholders’ meeting or board resolution; (xi) the 
establishment of a criminal investigation regarding the company or where judicial 
institutions have taken criminal enforcement measures against company directors, 
supervisory board members or senior management personnel;  and (xii) other events 
stipulated in regulation by the CSRC.  Only item (xi), criminal investigation or criminal 
enforcement against company officials, is new when compared to the same definitional 
clause in the 1999 PRC Securities Law.    
 
The significant aspect of this statutory definition of inside information is the two 
bites of the apple given to the CSRC.  First, the catch-all delegation of authority to the 
CSRC at Article 75(viii) allows the securities regulator to “recognize and confirm” other 
important information that has “a significant effect” on the trading price of securities.  
Second, the cross-reference in Article 75(i) to Article 67(2)(xii) of the 2006 PRC 
Securities Law gives the CSRC authority to stipulate in regulation other important 
(zhongda) events that can be imported into the definition of inside information.  These 
two invitations, different in nature (one allows mere “recognition and confirmation”, the 
other requires “stipulation in regulation”), are taken up with gusto in the 2007 Insider 
Trading Guidance Provisions described below.  
 
At this stage of exposition, it is important to note two things about Article 75 and 
the definition of inside information:  First, the statutory provisions give meaning to a 
specific defined term – “inside information” (neimu xinxi) – which is one of the elements 
necessary to make out insider trading liability under Articles 73, 74 and 76 of the 2006 
PRC Securities Law.  Second, neither Article 75 nor any other statutory provision alludes 
to a “price sensitive period.”  Each of these aspects will become important in the analysis 
of the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, below, where the term “inside 
information” is a defined term used in a completely different architecture of the insider 
trading prohibition, and certain information becomes actionable “inside information” 
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In sum, the statutory forms of Articles 73-76 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law – if 
undisturbed by the subsequent 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions—create a 
system whereby only specifically-enumerated traders may have liability, a structure 
which can be both overbroad and under-inclusive.   
 
It is potentially overbroad given the clear liability for innocent traders who are 
part of the Article 74 enumerated class and who trade while merely in possession of 
statutorily-defined inside information.  One aspect of the over-broadness problem, at least 
with respect to liability for “persons with knowledge of inside information”, is the failure 
of Chinese law to require any scienter or breach of duty on the part of those in possession 
of inside information who trade in the relevant securities before public disclosure of the 
information.  (This problem does not apply to those who have misappropriated inside 
information under Articles 73 and 76, as their illegal procurement of inside information 
serves as an adequate proxy for fault or breach.  Nor does this critique apply to the crime 
of insider trading under Article 231 of the Securities Law, Article 180 of the PRC 
Criminal Law and the 2012 Criminal Enforcement Explanation, which requires some 
showing of intentionality, interpreted as actual intent or recklessness.26)  This raises the 
very strong possibility of strict liability for certain individuals who trade innocently in the 
relevant securities while they happen to be in possession of inside information.  Professor 
Huang Hui of the Chinese University of Hong Kong has attempted to imply something 
less draconian than strict liability when writing about the analogous provisions of the 
1999 PRC Securities Law.  He understands the defendant’s “knowledge that the 
possessed information is material and non-public” as a necessary element27 in 
establishing the case, and further divines a necessary causal link between the defendant 
insider’s position and the acquisition of information, such that “persons with knowledge 
of inside information” are prohibited from trading only if they have access to the 
information because of their connection with the company whose securities are affected, 
by virtue of their office or profession.28  Professor Huang seem to conjure critical 
elements out of thin air: what he understands as a kind of breach of duty/scienter “lite” 
element, and what he later calls a “causal link” between trader status and “acquisition” 
(or even possession) of information.  This effort to read some kind of intentionality 
requirement into the statute ultimately fails,29 and it is instead clear that – at least insofar 
                                                 
26 PRC Criminal Law, art.  14.  Merely negligent behavior is only subject to 
criminal prosecution when the Criminal Law explicitly says so.  Id., art. 15. 
27 See Hui Huang, The Regulation of Insider Trading in China: A Critical 
Review and Proposals for Reform, 17 Austl. J. Corp. L. 281, 291-292 (2005).   
28 Id. at 294-295. 
29 As Professor Huang also recognizes: “This issue [“possession versus use”] 
is largely ignored in China… the issue deserves careful attention, particularly given the 
stiff liability of insider trading.”  Id. at 292. 
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as the statute is concerned—there is strict liability for the 2006 PRC Securities Law 
Article 74-enumerated persons who happen to possess inside information at the time they 
trade in securities of the company.   
 
The structure is under-inclusive for traders not part of the Article 74 enumerated 
class but who trade on statutorily-defined “inside information”, even apparently “tippers” 
alluded to in Article 76 (unless such “tippers” are also guilty of misappropriation).  Two 
other kinds of transactions, punished by almost any coherent insider trading enforcement 
regime, fall outside of the Article 73-76 system: (i) “tippee” trading, and (ii) where an 
individual who acts as the financial advisor to an acquiring company trades in the stock 
of a listed target (defined here in short form as “tippees” and “M&A advisors” 
respectively).  In neither case (and other than tippees or M&A advisors who have also 
engaged in misappropriation) is there any basis for the assertion of insider trading 
liability against such persons trading on non-public, material, information under the 2006 
PRC Securities Law.  “Tippees” are exculpated because Article 76 only prohibits 
“tipping” (although “tippees” would have liability if coincidentally members of the 
Article 74-enumerated class of persons with knowledge of inside information, or their 
gaining the tip involved some kind of misappropriation of inside information).  “M&A 
advisors” (again, unless guilty of misappropriation) are also not liable because they are 
outside of the enumerated class of traders listed in Article 74, as they are not employed at 
the company which issues the traded stock.   
 
b. The CSRC’s Parallel and Conflicting Enforcement Regime 
 
The CSRC evidently created the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions in 
response to the invitation at Article 74(vii) of the 2006 PRC Securities Law (and the 
more suitable invitation at Article 75(viii) of the same statute, calling for CSRC 
“recognition and confirmation” of important information that has a significant effect on 
securities’ trading prices).  However, the job was done very badly, with the CSRC issuing 
non-administrative regulatory norms of doubtful legality30 that far exceed the statutory 
invitation.31  While the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions do widen very significantly 
                                                 
30 See Enforcement Without Foundation, supra note 16.  This problem is 
apparent in other key areas of PRC regulation and enforcement.  See Wei Cui, What is the 
“Law” in Chinese Tax Administration? 19:1 Asia Pac. L. Rev.  75 (2011) (regarding the 
issuance and application of ultra vires tax “circulars” by the PRC Ministry of Finance and 
the State Taxation Administration, and the latter’s 2010 regulation designed to legalize 
tax rule-making). 
31 By their explicit terms, the Guidance Provisions apply to trading of 
publicly issued and stock exchange-listed securities (Article 4(2)), and are to be “referred 
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the defined scope of “people with knowledge of inside information” under Article 74, 
they then go many steps further to recast entirely insider trading in China and create new 
and additional bases for liability, far beyond that ever contemplated in China’s 2006 
Securities Law.  The result, in U.S. jurisprudential terms, is non-public guidance – not 
law or administrative regulation – that provides for a Texas Gulf Sulphur theory of 
liability targeting anyone simply in possession of inside information who trades.  Recall 
that the 2006 PRC Securities Law provides for a much narrower version of liability, 
applicable only to specific insiders identified in, or pursuant to, the statute, plus what 
aspires to be liability connected to misappropriation.   
 
How do the 2007 Guidance Provisions accomplish this wholesale restructuring of 
PRC insider trading law?  Article 12 of the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions (under a 
Section IV entitled “The Recognition and Confirmation of Insider Trading Behavior”) 
ignores entirely the statutory scheme and sets forth a brand new architecture establishing 
the elements of insider trading, as follows: 
 
Article 12:  Securities trading activity that conforms to the following conditions 
shall constitute insider trading: 
 
(1)  the person undertaking the behavior is an insider; 
(2)  the information involved is inside information; 
(3)  the subject person buys or sells related securities during the price sensitive 
period of the inside information, or suggests that other persons buy or sell related 
securities, or reveals the information. 
 
This formulation is at substantial variance with, and goes far beyond, the insider trading 
regime as it is defined in Articles 73-76 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law described above. 
 
The Insider Trading Guidance Provisions at Articles 5 and 6 create a new defined 
term, “insider” (neimuren), which term does not appear in the 2006 PRC Securities Law.  
The Securities Law never mentions, or addresses the liability of, “insiders”, but only 
“persons with knowledge of inside information”, people guilty of misappropriation, and 
either of the foregoing who tip others.  The Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, 
authorized to elaborate the class of persons included in the category of “persons with 
knowledge of inside information”, do exactly the opposite at Article 6(1) and reverse-
                                                                                                                                                 
venues.  This limitation does not amount to much, as all insider trading enforcement 
actions are with respect to securities traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges 
(and might only be useful as a defense for state-owned enterprise insiders and political 
cadres illegally and personally trading in non-listed, non-tradable, shares in listed PRC 
issuers, whose actions bring other bases for liability). 
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merge the 2006 PRC Securities Law Article 74(i)-(vi) statutory list of “persons with 
knowledge of inside information” into the Guidance Provisions-created category of 
“insiders.”   The statutorily-ungrounded definition of “insider” is then further expanded 
in Articles 6(2)-(5) of the Provisions to include: 
 
• The issuer  (as a “person with knowledge of inside information”) 
• The controlling shareholder of the issuer, entities controlled by the actual control 
party of the issuer, and their respective directors, supervisory board members 
and senior management (as “persons with knowledge of inside information”) 
• Any party involved in a listed company’s merger, acquisition or reorganization 
and their relevant personnel (as “persons with knowledge of inside 
information”) 
• Persons who gain inside information in the performance of their work (as 
“persons with knowledge of inside information”) 
• The partners and spouses of those natural persons included in Article 74(i)-(vi) of 
the Securities Law (i.e.,  the statutorily-defined “persons with knowledge of 
inside information”) 
• The parents or children or other relatives of any natural persons included in the 
above categories who come into possession of inside information 
• Those who employ illegal methods such as trickery, coaxing, eavesdropping, 
monitoring, secret trading, etc. to gain inside information 
• Those who gain inside information through other channels  
 
Finally, Article 5 of the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions stipulates that such insiders 
may be legal persons as well as natural persons.  Perhaps most egregiously expansive in 
the new formulation is the substance of Article 6(5) of the Guidance Provisions, the last 
bullet above, which deems anyone “who gains inside information through other 
channels” to be an “insider” for enforcement purposes.  This is tantamount to declaring 
that trading while in mere possession of inside information (and during a price sensitive 
period) is a basis for insider trading liability in the PRC. 
 
As noted above, Article 75 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law defines “inside 
information” and lists items that are deemed to be inside information.  The statute also 
delegates to the CSRC the power to “recognize and confirm” other important information 
that has “a significant effect on the trading price of securities.”  The CSRC’s 2007 Insider 
Trading Guidance Provisions respond to this delegation, but in a way that looks past the 
statute.  Most importantly, the Guidance Provisions define “inside information” not for 
the 2006 PRC Securities Law (and Articles 73,74 and 76 which invoke use of such 
information as an element to make out the breach), but instead under the Guidance 
Provisions, and specifically the new and independent invocation of “inside information” 
in the Article 12 prohibition set forth above.  Thus, instead of using the Guidance 
Provisions to fill out the meaning of the statute, the Guidance Provisions use the statute to 
fill out, in part, the meaning of a newly employed term in the Provisions. 
17
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Article 7 of the Provisions changes ever so slightly the general definition of 
“inside information” in the preamble to Article 75 of the Securities Law, stating that 
inside information under the Provisions means “… non-public32 information relevant to a 
company’s business or financial affairs or which may have a major effect on the market 
price of a company’s securities…”.  Compare this formulation with the Securities Law 
Article 75 language, which focuses on information that may have a “major effect on the 
market price of that (gai) company’s securities.”  This very small difference may be 
designed to facilitate CSRC enforcement against defendants who trade in the securities 
other than firms where they are classical insiders, such as the insider trading M&A 
advisors described above.   
 
At Article 8, the Provisions then reverse-merge 2006 PRC Securities Law Article 
67(2) (piggy-backing onto Article 67(2)(xii)’s delegation to the CSRC of all Form 8-K-
type events which have a “relatively significant” effect on the securities price), Article 
75(ii)-(vii), and Article 75(viii)’s delegation of the power to determine “inside 
information” into the Provisions’ own definition of “inside information”.  Further, the 
Provisions at Article 8(5) declare simply that inside information under the same Guidance 
Provisions is “other important information that has a significant effect (xuanzhu yinxiang) 
on the trading price of securities” – which language tracks exactly the precise delegation 
made to the CSRC under Article 75(viii) of the 2006 PRC Securities Law.  In 
conversational terms, the statute authorizes the regulator to “define X to include whatever 
the regulator thinks has the properties of Y”, and the regulator responds with “We hereby 
define X to include whatever we think has the properties of Y”, without elaboration.  In 
short, the Guidance Provisions do not sharpen or define the CSRC’s enforcement power 
in any significant way, and instead offer somewhat tautological expressions of authority 
and coverage.  Happily, the Guidance Provisions at Article 9 do state what information 
that has “a significant effect on trading prices of securities” means: in normal 
circumstances, information that immediately upon disclosure and for a specified period 
causes the company’s trading price to depart significantly from the market index or the 
index for like issuers, or that causes significant volatility in the broad market index.   
 
Finally, Article 10 of the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions injects a 
totally new concept into the determination of what “inside information” is, such that 
specific information becomes actionable only when those in possession of it trade 
securities during a “price sensitive period.”  That period is defined in the Insider Trading 
Guidance Provisions to extend from the time when the inside information begins to be 
constituted to the moment when the information no longer has an effect on securities 
                                                 
32 The meaning of “public” is defined at Article 11 of the Insider Trading 
Guidance Provisions. 
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prices (the definition is further refined in the 2012 Criminal Enforcement Explanation 
with the elaboration of yet another new legal term with no statutory basis, “inside 
information sensitive period”).  This new concept is the result of a drafting difference 
between the 2006 PRC Securities Law and the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance 
Provisions.  As noted above, Article 76 of the Law states that people with knowledge of 
inside information relevant to specific securities are prohibited from doing certain things 
before such inside information is “publicly disclosed.”  Article 12(3) of the Guidance 
Provisions changes that prohibition to apply to a “price sensitive period” (jiage mingan 
qi), which is not bounded by the moment such information becomes “publicly disclosed.”   
Instead, the CSRC Guidance Provisions extinguish traders’ legal obligations at the 
moment when “the information no longer has an effect on securities prices” – a time very 
difficult for any trader in possession of inside information to determine with certainty.   
 
In sum, the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions explode the bounds of the 
2006 PRC Securities Law.  Whereas under the 2006 Law only a narrowly-defined class 
of “persons with knowledge of inside information” or those who engaged in 
misappropriation (acting directly or as tippers) could be liable for specifically-defined 
insider trading, under the CSRC’s 2007 Guidance Provisions any person simply in 
possession of information (and thus an “insider” under the Provisions) that is determined 
to be “inside information” who “purchases or sells relevant securities, or suggests that 
another purchase or sell such securities, or communicates such inside information” during 
a “price sensitive period” is liable for insider trading.33 
 
The result is a kind of strict liability under the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions 
for anyone trading in securities when deemed to be in possession of inside information 
and during a price sensitive period.  To be fair, the liability is not absolutely strict as the 
same Guidance Provisions introduce a scienter-like requirement – “whether or not [the 
defendant] knew or was informed of (zhicai) inside information – but only for (i) “the 
parents or children or other relatives of any natural persons” included in the expanded 
scope of “persons with knowledge of inside information” in the 2007 Guidance 
Provisions34 and (ii) “those who employ illegal methods such as trickery, coaxing, 
                                                 
33 It should be noted that the Provisions, at Article 19, provide diverse bases 
for exculpation, ranging from blanket exculpation (e.g., stock buy-backs or transactions 
pursuant to triggered mandatory offers) to knowledge defenses and even the broad 
discretion of the CSRC.   
34 Limited to: the securities issuer; the controlling shareholder of the issuer, 
companies controlled by the actual control party of the issuer, and their respective 
directors, supervisory board members and senior management; any party involved in a 
listed company’s merger, acquisition or reorganization and their relevant personnel; and 
persons who gain inside information in the performance of their work. 
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eavesdropping, monitoring, secret trading, etc. to gain inside information;” and “those 
who gain inside information through other channels.”35  This will be cold comfort for the 
huge class of other potential defendants, for at the same time the 2007 Guidance 
Provisions make insider trading liability only stricter for (i) the “persons with knowledge 
of inside information” originally listed in the 2006 PRC Securities Law at Article74(i)-
(vi) and (ii) the expanded scope of such persons, reversing the burden of proof so that 
such defendants will be liable for insider trading during the price sensitive period unless 
“they have sufficient evidence to demonstrate that they did not know or were not 
informed of inside information.”36 
 
How do these major differences between the statute and CSRC enforcement 
“guidance” work out in potential application to culpable trading?  Here I give two 
examples.  First, “tippees” (as defined above) who are not guilty of misappropriation and 
who trade during the price sensitive period would be liable under the CSRC Insider 
Trading Guidance Provisions, although not under the 2006 PRC Securities Law.  
Likewise, M&A advisors (as defined above) consulting for an acquirer and trading in the 
shares of a target company during a price sensitive period would also be liable for insider 
trading under the CSRC Guidance Provisions, but not under the Securities Law.  To be 
very clear, the issue is not that the CSRC has broadened the scope of “persons with 
knowledge of inside information” under Article 74 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law, 
something that agency was perfectly entitled to do.   Instead, the problem is that the 
CSRC has created a whole new class of defendants—outside of “persons with knowledge 
of inside information,” and those guilty of misappropriation (acting directly or as 
“tippers”) – called “insiders” who can now be exposed to serious liability if they trade 
during a price sensitive period with respect to any securities (i.e., not the securities of the 
company relevant to their status), and with a new burden of proof which almost assures 
their guilt (unless they can prove a negative, that they did not know or were not informed 
of the inside information). 
 
Finally, insider trading prohibitions in the PRC are enforced through 
administrative and criminal penalties.  There remains some question as to the grounds for 
a private right of action in damages for other market participants.  
 
Article 202 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law provides the basis for administrative 
enforcement and penalties, which include: disposition of the illegally traded securities, 
confiscation of illegal proceeds, and the levy of administrative fines ranging from one to 
five times illegal proceeds.  The Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, at Articles 21-23, 
describe how the CSRC calculates “proceeds.”  Articles 24 and 25 of the Provisions 
                                                 
35 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, art. 14(2). 
36 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, art. 14(2). 
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present guidelines for CSRC determination of the relative severity of administrative 
sanctions.  (Provision is also made for penalizing traders who do not realize gains from 
illegal insider trading, or only de minimus gains.)  Fines and warnings may also be levied 
on or directed at natural persons involved with insider trading by legal entities.  Personnel 
from securities regulatory institutions who engage in insider trading are subject to the 
heaviest administrative penalties.  Article 180 of the PRC Criminal Law (buttressed by 
the 2006 PRC Securities Law’s Article 231) provides for criminal penalties against 
insider trading, including imprisonment for up to ten years and criminal fines (one to five 
times illegal proceeds).  As noted above, in May 2012 criminal enforcement of the insider 
trading prohibition was sharply narrowed with issuance of the Supreme People’s Court 
and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate joint Criminal Enforcement Explanation, which 
reasserts the 2006 PRC Securities Law limitation on “persons with knowledge of inside 
information” as only those listed in Article 74 of the statute and elaborates slightly on 
what constitutes misappropriation and tipping of inside information.  
 
The grounds for a private civil action, difficult in any case given causation and 
reliance elements and the competence of China’s developing judiciary, are a bit murkier 
under PRC law.  Article 207 of the superseded 1999 PRC Securities Law referred to 
“civil damages” arising in connection with insider trading, but made no mention as to 
how any victim of a defendant’s adjudicated insider trading might sue for such damages.  
There is a similar, if stronger, hint of a private claim at Article 76 of the 2006 PRC 
Securities Law, which holds:  “Where investors have experienced losses from insider 
trading behavior, the [inside] traders should bear compensation liability in accordance 
with law.”  (The same clause appears at Article 77 with respect to securities trading 
manipulation.)  However, there is no further elaboration of, or legal basis for, a private 
civil claim in the 2006 PRC Securities Law, which means that Chinese victims of 
someone else’s insider trading would have to rely on a private suit in tort (or “rights 
infringement” (qinquan) under the PRC system) or possibly contract.  Any effort by PRC 
plaintiffs to make out such a claim would very likely be met with a denial by the Chinese 
judiciary because of the absence of a clear “legal basis” (falü yiju) in statute for the claim.  
As one authoritative PRC securities law specialist concludes, “… thus there is still no 
way to fully protect the compensation [rights] for investors who are harmed by insider 
trading behavior.”37 
 
IV. Enforcement Against Insider Trading Pursuant to Statute and “Guidance” 
 
In specific insider trading enforcement actions, the CSRC has generally 
conformed to its reputation for seriousness of purpose, technical competence, and 
independence.  For instance, the agency is rapidly developing a kind of insider trading-
                                                 
37 Ye, supra note 24, at 312 
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specific “common law” addressing complex issues of legal presumption, burdens of 
proof, and scienter.38  Yet, from a higher level, the CSRC is engaging in enforcement 
behavior which is arguably extra-legal: for, regardless of the clear conflict between the 
two regulatory structures described in statute, on one hand (modified “classical” plus 
O’Hagen misappropriation), and internal agency “guidance”, on the other (Texas Gulf 
Sulphur or mere possession of material, non-public, information while trading), the 
CSRC is actively enforcing insider trading liability under the extremely broad theory 
promised by the defective 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, and in situations 
where the explicit terms of the 2006 PRC Securities Law do not provide for liability.  
PRC academics note this,39 and a glance at the most recent enforcement decisions posted 
on the CSRC website confirms the problem:    
 
A 2011 enforcement decision40 shows how liberally the CSRC misapplies Article 
74 of the PRC 2006 Securities Law, in that the defendant is pronounced “a person with 
knowledge of inside information” simply because he “participated in… [the reverse 
merger] related affairs.”  This is not the same thing provided for under Article 74(iv) 
(“persons who are able to obtain relevant inside information concerning the company by 
virtue of the position they hold in the company”), which is unavailable precisely because 
the defendant comes into possession of important information about a company – the 
target—different from the one he is employed at.  Nor does the CSRC makes any effort 
to base his liability in the misappropriation prong of the statute.  The CSRC is clearly 
relying upon the wider basis for insider trading liability provided in the 2007 Insider 
Trading Guidance Provisions.  
 
                                                 
38 See Wu  & Pu, supra note 7, at 374 (describing CSRC jurisprudence in 
2009 regarding: burden of proof on trader’s defense that alleged inside information was 
developed from independent analysis; definition of “knowing” (or should have known) 
inside information; liability for traders who engage in insider trading only to incur losses 
and thus have no proceeds from breach; and the evidentiary approach to use of proxy 
accounts for insider trading). 
39 Ye, supra note 24, at 319 (“The [Insider Trading Guidance Provisions] 
clearly stipulate that where insider trading with respect to any exchange-issued or -listed 
securities is identified, the Guidance Provisions are to be applied.  If insider trading is 
identified on any other State Council-approved securities exchange, enforcement is to be 
implemented with reference to the Guidance Provisions.”) 
40 See Zhongguo Zhengjianhui Xingzheng Chufa Juedingshu (Liu Yang) 
[China Securities Regulatory Commission Administrative Punishment Decision (Liu 
Yang)] (2011) No. 24, issued June 14, 2011. 
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In another 2011 enforcement action,41 the CSRC does not indicate how the 
defendant qualifies as one of the persons enumerated in Article 74 of the 2006 PRC 
Securities Law, concluding simply that he became a “person with knowledge of inside 
information.”  He is not identified as an officer or shareholder of the selling controlling 
shareholder of the issuer, although he is identified as the top executive of another entity 
which may be a shareholder of the issuer holding more than five percent of the issuer per 
Article 74(ii) of the Securities Law.  Nowhere in the decision does the CSRC feel the 
need to articulate how this defendant qualifies as a “person with knowledge of inside 
information”, or if he is guilty of misappropriation of the information, no doubt because 
they are relying upon the broader basis for insider trading liability provided for in the 
2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions. 
 
In a standard 2010 husband-wife/tipper-tippee case,42 the CSRC simply declares 
the husband/tipper to be a “person with knowledge of inside information” without tying 
his status to the enumerated persons under Article 74.  Nor does the CSRC independently 
identify him as a person guilty of misappropriation under Articles 73 and 76.  He may be 
a tipper of material, non-public, information, but because he is neither a “person with 
knowledge of inside information” nor guilty of misappropriation, technically he is not 
subject to the tipping prohibition under Article 76.  Thus, as a person who has merely 
come into possession of inside information, it is unclear how he is an insider trading 
defendant under the 2006 PRC Securities Law, unless the CSRC is using the broad basis 
for enforcement provided for under the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions.  
Second, the wife is a tippee-trader of inside information, and again there is no connection 
between her possession of the information and any kind of misappropriation.  She is 
therefore not an appropriate defendant under the 2006 PRC Securities Law, and the only 
way in which the CSRC can accomplish enforcement against her is via the 2007 Insider 
Trading Guidance Provisions. 
 
There remains a question as to whether the PRC People’s Procuratorate was or is 
using the extra-legal coverage of the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions to establish the 
elements of the crime of insider trading via Article 180 of the PRC Criminal Law, 
thereby resulting in the imprisonment of certain persons.  The real picture of criminal 
enforcement of the insider trading prohibition and Article 180 of the Criminal Law is 
obscured for legal analysts because criminal judgments are not publicized or reasoned in 
                                                 
41 See Zhongguo Zhengjianhui Xingzheng Chufa Juedingshu (Lin Shiquan) 
[China Securities Regulatory Commission Administrative Punishment Decision (Lin 
Shiquan)] (2011) No. 26, issued June 29, 2011.   
42 See Zhongguo Zhengjianhui Xingzheng Chufa Juedingshu (Jia Huazhang 
and Liu Rong) [China Securities Regulatory Commission Administrative Punishment 
Decision (Jia Huazhang and Liu Rong)] (2010) No. 53, issued Dec. 21, 2010.  
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the way civil and administrative law cases increasingly are.  Instead, criminal defendants 
are simply reported to be guilty of “insider trading” and then subject to criminal 
punishment.  Given the CSRC’s attitude towards extra-legal insider trading enforcement, 
it is not unreasonable to think that the People’s Procuratorate – as advised by the expert 
agency charged with enforcement, the CSRC – has also used the defective Guidance 
Provisions in the criminal sphere.  This is certainly the implication of the rather sudden 
release of the 2012 Criminal Enforcement Explanation, which strongly reasserts the 
primacy of the statutory architecture over the unbounded 2007 Insider Trading Guidance 
Provisions in respect of criminal prosecutions.  
 
V. Conclusion and Proposal for Amendment 
 
The foregoing analysis tells us that the CSRC has enforced the 2006 PRC 
Securities Law prohibitions on insider trading not in accordance with the narrow theory 
set out in the Securities Law itself, but pursuant to the very expansive theory that lives 
through the ultra vires 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions.  Using U.S. 
jurisprudence by analogy, it seems that stuck with a statutory scheme that looks like a 
loose assemblage of the Cady, Roberts/Chiarella fiduciary duty and O’Hagen 
misappropriation lines, the Chinese securities regulator nonetheless wields a stick that 
tracks the broad enforcement regime implied in Texas Gulf Sulphur.  It is also highly 
likely that the PRC public prosecutor has used the defective Insider Trading Guidance 
Provisions as the sole basis for enforcement of the crime of insider trading in cases where 
the alleged behavior of defendants does not come within the scope of the 2006 PRC 
Securities Law and the PRC Criminal Law. If nothing else, examples of extra-legal 
enforcement in the administrative sphere demonstrate clear violations of the 1996 Law of 
the PRC on Administrative Punishments, which forbids the imposition of administrative 
punishments without a statutory basis, makes invalid administrative punishments 
imposed not in accordance with law, and forbids the imposition of administrative 
punishment under law other than in accordance with publicly-promulgated norms.  Extra-
legal enforcement in the criminal sphere is only more problematic, and contrary to a 
number of key Chinese laws and policy statements, from the PRC Law on Legislation to 
the PRC Constitution. 
 
Interestingly, the serious problem of illegality and mismatch regarding insider 
trading enforcement described in this paper does not pertain with respect to the separate 
prohibition against “securities trading manipulation” under Article 77 of the 2006 PRC 
Securities Law.  For such manipulation, the CSRC is perfectly in compliance with the 
law in providing mere “guidance” for enforcement,43 because Article 77 is drafted at a 
                                                 
43 Which it did at the same time it issued the defective Insider Trading 
Guidance Provisions in 2007. 
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high level of generality, Article 77(iv) provides a broad catch-all against “other methods” 
of manipulation with no specific required elements to make out “manipulation” (such as 
scienter, purchase or sale of securities, etc.), and the statute makes no affirmative 
delegation of regulatory power to the CSRC or any other agency.  Accordingly, the 
CSRC is free under the statute to enforce against such manipulative trading in any way it 
determines, and without reference to any notified or universally applicable administrative 
law norm – something I argue it cannot do with respect to insider trading. 
 
Some, noting the anemic enforcement against rampant insider trading in the 
Chinese capital markets and less attuned to legal niceties in a developing legal system, 
may see extra-legal and over-broad enforcement by the PRC securities regulator or the 
public prosecutor as a positive phenomenon.  How else, other than by the most aggressive 
and far-reaching enforcement design and practice, can the Chinese regulator punish 
brazen violators whose virtually costless behavior only fuels the vicious circle that leads 
to ever-increasing insider trading and market manipulation?  After all, they point out, 
many of the people made insider trading defendants are in fact guilty of trading on non-
public, material, information, even if their behavior does not breach the narrowly-drawn 
statutory prohibition.  
 
Others, even if they do not overly object to the legal infirmities of the CSRC 
Guidance Provisions-based enforcement regime, will recognize that the illegality of 
insider trading enforcement norms casts a significant shadow over the PRC securities 
regulator’s ability to govern China’s capital markets, and thereby ensure the perceived 
transparency and information symmetry critical to sustaining investor confidence and 
participation.  Any successful legal challenge to administrative or criminal enforcement 
of insider trading prohibitions by defendants would constitute a body blow to the 
regulator’s hard-earned reputation for competence, regulatory power, and technical 
sophistication, and confirm what many small investors already understand as the unlevel 
playing field characterizing China’s “casino” markets.  Moreover, it would contribute to 
the vicious circle whereby the apparent costs of engaging in insider trading are virtually 
nil, encouraging in turn expanded illegal activity going forward.  
 
The way to solve this particular set of problems is to recast, in its entirety, the 
statutory insider trading prohibition set forth in the PRC Securities Law.  Specifically, 
that means abandoning (again using U.S. jurisprudence by analogy) the current PRC 
scheme stitching together the Cady, Roberts/Chiarella fiduciary duty and O’Hagen 
misappropriation lines, and replacing it with a system very close to what the CSRC has 
tried to employ, albeit ultra vires and illegally, with the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance 
Provisions, or a system closely modeled on the European Union (“EU”) Market Abuse 
Directive of 2003 (“MAD”) and the United Kingdom’s Financial Services and Markets 
Act of 2000 (“FSMA”), which ironically is based in the same theories supporting the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur decision rejected long ago by the U.S. Supreme Court (but which 
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Without going into too much detail in this paper concerning the mechanics of the 
EU and UK systems, suffice to say that both are rooted in the concept of what is 
variously called “equal access to information”, “parity of information” or “market 
egalitarianism”.  Accordingly, the EU’s MAD contains broad provisions that prohibit 
persons in possession of inside information from (i) dealing in the securities to which the 
information relates using inside information, (ii) disclosing inside information to third 
parties unless the disclosure is made in the normal course of employment, profession or 
duties, (iii) recommending or inducing other persons, on the basis of inside information, 
to trade.  Similarly, the UK’s FSMA, at Section 118(2), defines “market abuse” to 
include situations where a person who has inside information “deals or attempts to deal in 
a qualifying investment or related investment on the basis of inside information relating 
to the investment in question.”  As can be seen clearly, both European regimes neglect to 
fetishize “fiduciary duty” and breach of those duties in the style of U.S. federal 
jurisprudence, and instead extend the prohibition against insider trading (or “market 
abuse”) to anyone who, in the words of MAD, “possesses inside information while that 
person knows, or ought to have known, that it is inside information.”44  Stated succinctly, 
“insiders” subject to the insider trading prohibition in the EU and the UK is a broader 
class of persons who merely come into possession of inside information, and not the far 
narrower class of persons in the U.S. who have breached a duty either to the eventual 
trading counterparty or the source of the information (or their respective tippees).  
Indeed, as noted above, this is precisely the theory and system the CRSC has tried to 
impose in China via the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, albeit in direct 
conflict with the statutory basis provided for in the 2006 PRC Securities Law. 
 
If the PRC Securities Law, and specifically the provisions on insider trading, are 
amended to conform with the EU and UK systems, some might object that this puts too 
much power into the hands of the CSRC and (for criminal prosecutions) the PRC 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate to enforce against, or prosecute, innocent, benign or 
legitimate market behavior, or behavior that does not injure other market participants or 
indeed enhances the information efficiency of the Chinese capital markets.  These are the 
same sophisticated arguments often put forward in the U.S. discourse at any time 
defendants and market participants perceive an attempt to depart from the U.S.’s 
traditional adherence to its very narrow fiduciary duty and misappropriation-based 
theories of enforcement.  The answer to these concerns is that China is very different 
from the U.S., and that the PRC’s capital markets are at a very different stage of 
development.  In the PRC, the problems are (i) under-enforcement of the insider trading 
prohibition arising, in part, from a dysfunctional statutory scheme, and (ii) a widely-
                                                 
44  Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
Jan. 28, 2003 on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. (I. 
96) 16, art. 4. 
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shared perception that the PRC Mainland markets are characterized by lack of 
transparency, informational asymmetry and large-scale, and unchecked, manipulation.  
Accordingly, any new scheme which elaborates and clarifies enforcement possibilities 
against insider trading (and general “market manipulation”) must be a net positive in the 
context of contemporary China.  In my personal opinion then, a new insider trading 
prohibition written into China’s amended Securities Law more closely modeled on the 
schemes described in the EU’s MAD and the UK’s FSMA, and underlying the U.S.’s 
exceptional Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14e-3, would be in China’s national 
interest, and would further the healthy development of the PRC’s domestic capital 
markets.       
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Appendix  – Selected Statutory Provisions 
 
2006 PRC Securities Law 
 
Article 73.  It is prohibited for those with knowledge of securities trading 
[related] inside information or those who have illegally procured inside 
information to use inside information in undertaking securities trading 
activities.  
 
Article 74.  Persons with knowledge of securities trading [related] inside 
information include:  
 
(i) directors, supervisory board members, and senior managers of the 
issuer;  
(ii) 5% or more shareholders of the company and its/their directors, 
supervisory board members and senior managers, and the actual 
controlling shareholders of the company and its/their directors, 
supervisory board members and senior managers;  
(iii) directors, supervisory board members and senior managers of 
companies controlled by the issuer;45  
(iv) people whose executive or staff position in the company provides 
access to inside information;  
(v) Securities Regulatory Organ [CSRC] staff and others who pursuant 
to their legally stipulated duties administer or regulate securities 
issuance and trading;  
(vi) relevant securities sponsors, underwriters, securities exchange 
personnel, securities registration and settlement personnel, and 
securities service institution personnel; and 
(vii) other persons stipulated in regulation by the State Council 
Securities Regulatory Organ [the CSRC]. 
 
Article 75.  Inside information means non-public information relevant to a 
company’s business or financial affairs or which may have a major effect 
on the market price of that company’s securities in the course of securities 
trading activities.  The following information all constitutes inside 
                                                 
45 Appropriately adjusted in Article 6(ii)(2) of the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance 
Provisions to mean: “the controlling shareholders of the issuer or listed company, other 
companies controlled by the actual control party, and their directors, supervisory board 
members and senior management.”   
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information:… (viii) other important information recognized and 
confirmed by the State Council Securities Regulatory Organ [the CSRC] 
to have a significant effect on the trading price of securities.  
 
Article 76.  Those with knowledge of inside information related to 
securities trading and those who have illegally procured inside information 
may not, prior to public disclosure of the inside information, purchase or 
sell that company’s securities, or disclose such information, or suggest that 
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2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions 
 
Article 12.  Securities trading activity that conforms to the following 
conditions shall constitute insider trading: (1) the person undertaking the 
behavior is an insider; (2) the information involved is inside information; 
and (3) the subject person buys or sells related securities during the price 
sensitive period of the inside information, or suggests that other persons 
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